

CAI

PS

- 1994


C16

Government
Publications

Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform

**Proposals for Policy Changes
by the United Nations and the
Government of Canada**

3 1761 11708883 1



The Canadian Committee for the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations



Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform

**Proposals for Policy Changes
by the United Nations and the
Government of Canada**



prepared by:
**The Canadian Committee for the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations**

June, 1994

*This document has been published with the support of
the United Nations Association in Canada and the
Canada Communications Group.*



Table of Contents

Foreword	v
Executive Summary	vii
Introduction	1
An Agenda for the Reform of the UN System	5
An Agenda for Peace	16
An Agenda for Development	30
An Agenda for Human Rights	38
The Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations	43



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761117088831>

Foreword

This paper, *Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform*, is the first substantive achievement of the Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.

The object of the exercise is to present to the people and Government of Canada key elements of a reform strategy that would guide Canadian policy toward the United Nations system. To that end, we have amassed a large number of recommendations – 52 to be precise – on topics ranging from international peace and security to the protection of human rights. Because of the sheer volume of our proposals, however, we have provided a much smaller number of principal recommendations in the Executive Summary of this paper. These represent our priorities for consideration and action by the Canadian Government.


The paper had a lengthy gestation period, which allowed for considerable reflection and consultation with members of the Canadian Committee. In particular, the UN Reform Satellite Committee, which acts as the locus of policy and research issues for the Canadian Committee, played a special role in considering various drafts.

Above all, the drafting of *Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform* was the responsibility of two persons: Michael Oliver, the Chair of our UN Reform Satellite Committee, and Gregory Wirick, Special Advisor to that Satellite Committee. We are very grateful to them for their efforts.

In addition, they would want me to mention the efforts of several others who contributed ideas and time and energy to preparing the final draft: William Barton, Jan Bauer, Alan Blakeney, Edward Broadbent, David Cox, Jules Deschènes, Jules Dufour, Nancy Gordon, Georges Hénault, Geoffrey Pearson, David Pollock, Louis Sabourin, Blair Seaborn, John Sigler, Christopher Spencer, Norma Walmsley, and Fergus Watt.

The Executive Summary, which follows this foreword, concentrates on six key areas of action for United Nations reform, as well as a recommendation for Canadian Policy, rather than attempting to

cover all 52 recommendations in summary form. The totality of this effort is not intended to be exhaustive; the Canadian Committee will continue to analyze and make recommendations for additional reforms. It is, however, intended to present the United Nations and the Government of Canada with a clear blueprint for action as of this date. Accordingly, we hope it will be found useful, practical and, above all, that it will help stimulate the reforms that are a prerequisite for the UN's effective adaptation to the changed circumstances of the world on the eve of the second millennium.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Douglas Roche". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Douglas" is on the left and the last name "Roche" is on the right, with a slight gap between them. The ink is dark and the background is a light, slightly textured paper.

Douglas Roche, O.C.
Chair, Canadian Committee for the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations

Executive Summary

This summary concentrates on six key areas of action chosen from among the 52 recommendations that appear in the document proper. These represent our perceptions of the most urgent areas for action.

The human race is currently undergoing the most fundamental and rapid revolution in its history. Its origin and driving force are the enormous and accelerating discovery, spread and use of knowledge, the momentum of which cannot be stopped or its general direction changed. Indeed, it can barely be influenced, even when it produces obvious and avoidable threats like nuclear weapons, unsustainable use of resources, and obscene human inequities, all of which add to the complexity, distortions, pressures and, ultimately, the instability of the international system.

To meet these challenges and to become the main instrument for building a peaceful and more equitable world, the United Nations must command belief in its effectiveness. As its functions expand, its form must be equal to the new or more intensified tasks it is asked to undertake.

1. Reform of the Security Council

In particular, reform of the Security Council is pressing for two reasons: first, its permanent membership no longer reflects the reality of global power; secondly, its credibility as an impartial intervenor in situations that threaten common security is undermined by the disproportionate influence within it of Northern, and especially North Atlantic, states. The significance of these shortcomings in the Security Council is magnified by the fact that, alone among UN bodies, its decisions are binding on all member states.

At some future time, the distinctions between permanent and non-permanent members, members with and without a veto, deserve to be eliminated. That time, it is generally agreed, is not yet. If, as the

Secretary-General still hopes, a partial reform of the Security Council is still possible for the 50th Anniversary, intensive negotiations will take place, and compromises will have to be reached. Canada, as an active member of the Open-ended Working Group on the Reform of the Council, will have a vital role to play in these negotiations. Rather than adopting a fixed position, it is recommended that Canada should follow these guidelines:

- **Support an increase in the number of Security Council members up to 21 members (from the current 15).**
- **Agree to an increase in the number of permanent seats for developed countries only if permanent seats are added for three states from the South.**
- **Work for reduction in the significance of the veto power by such means as: (a) denying the veto power to new members of the Security Council; or (b) making the veto valid only if exercised by three permanent members rather than, as at present, any one permanent member; (c) and/or limiting the kinds of issues on which the veto can be exercised (at a minimum, the veto over amendments to the Charter and the appointment of the Secretary-General should go); and/or (d) establishing new majorities for passage of categories of Security Council resolutions to replace the general veto for permanent members.**
- **Support the principle of a fixed proportion of the seats on the Security Council coming from the South. (*See Recommendations 2-5*)**

2. Finances

Both the revenues and expenditures of the UN need attention. It is gratifying that Canada has never been in arrears in either its regular or peace-keeping payments to the UN. Unfortunately, the record of many other states is quite different.

The expenditures of the United Nations are undoubtedly made with the same level of control and effective management as most of the better-run member states. That does not mean that they are not in need of improvement – far from it.

- **Canada should renew its support, first given in 1979, for value-for-money auditing; for the appointment of an Auditor-General for the UN, with a five- year contract, appointed by and accountable to the General Assembly; and for the parallel creation of an internal management review system accountable to the Secretary-General. (See Recommendation 16)**

3. *An Agenda for Peace*

There are a number of questions that must be posed about the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. Among them are the following:

- What is the responsibility of United Nations members for disasters like Rwanda and Bosnia that do not directly affect their national security and other interests? In fact, is there an international responsibility that arises from membership in the UN?
- Under what legal authority can an international organization assume quasi-government responsibilities in failed states, of which there is a lengthening list?
- Except when there is a clear case of aggression, are there any circumstances in which an international force should take sides or fight in a civil war? If so, who is to do the fighting?

The UN faces a dilemma. The expectations of the public for the world body grow with every fresh disaster, but the member states of the UN still have not committed themselves to the fundamental concept of *common security*. The UN's capacity to respond effectively is constrained by a hundred practical shortcomings and by the reluctance and hesitations of the member states which comprise the organization and which appear not to support a more effective role.

Partly, in an effort to break through this impasse, the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 pursuant to a request from the first and only Summit Meeting of the Security Council for an analysis of potential international capabilities in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. This document has set off a worldwide round of reflection and debate. Canadians in particular, however, have been keen to do

their part to move the organization beyond debate to action that would dramatically improve UN capacities.

Among the many suggestions that *An Agenda for Peace* made was a proposal that special forces – peace enforcement units – be constituted in situations of high risk. Peace enforcement units, therefore, would be a mid-point between traditional UN peace-keeping and Chapter VII style enforcement actions. The Secretary-General has since clarified that he had in mind a standby quick reaction force composed of national elements, which in turn would be based on volunteers from the regular units of national military forces.

Even though the political climate is not currently receptive, it is important for Canada to examine this concept. The proposal for a UN standby force able to deploy quickly is closely linked to both early warning and preventive deployments whereby a potential conflict is deterred or contained through an early UN presence in the field.

Official Canadian statements have invariably emphasized the need for international action prior to the point where bloodshed hardens the attitudes of the parties. The exploration of the requirements for a UN quick reaction force and possible Canadian commitments thereto is a logical extension of the Canadian approach.

- **The Government of Canada should press for the creation of international peace enforcement units to be deployed either as a quick reaction force or in other situations of high risk. It should immediately offer a Canadian contribution to such units. These troops, to be drawn on a volunteer basis from among both regular and reserve personnel of the Canadian Forces, would be more heavily armed and could undertake a variety of tasks from providing protection for humanitarian relief work to securing ceasefire lines. (See Recommendation 25)**

4. Arms Proliferation

In today's strategic climate, there is a consensus among the former Cold War adversaries on the need for a more systematic, international approach to restrictions on arms sales so as to prevent re-

gional arms races and limit the consequences of regional instability. Unfortunately, agreeing on the principle of arms export restraint is far easier than putting it into practice.

Late in 1991 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which formally established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This requested member nations to provide data regarding certain categories of arms exports and imports. The Register is viewed as an "early warning device" which will provide advanced notice of nations and regions where a potentially destabilizing build-up of armaments is taking place. It is intended to establish a universal and non-discriminating repository of data and information. No verification provisions are included in the Register, but entries can be cross-checked to see if declared imports by one nation tally with exports from others.

Nevertheless, the Register has been criticised for being far too general in that it does not require specific types of weapons to be identified. Genuine transparency requires knowing what a state is holding and acquiring, not merely what it is importing. The best estimate is that only between 20-25 per cent of arms production is traded internationally; the rest is procured by their producer.

- **There are four ways in which Canada should seek to improve the UN's Register of Conventional Arms:**

- a) universal reporting by all member states should be strongly encouraged;**

- b) other arms-supplying countries should be encouraged to prohibit sales to countries which do not report to the UN Register;**

- c) definitions should be improved and the scope of the Register enlarged to include domestic procurement and national holdings so as to give a true picture of military capabilities; and**

- d) Canada should prohibit arms sales to countries which do not report fully to the UN Register, or which are subject to UN embargoes. (*See Recommendations 33 and 34*)**

The fundamental problem with respect to weapons proliferation is that export controls are not the solution to solving regional con-

flicts. Export controls can slow down regional arms races and delay or even prevent the acquisition of some of the most threatening weaponry. Yet if nations feel threatened militarily, they will seek to enhance their security by acquiring whatever armaments they can. The most effective means of curbing the trade in arms will be by seeking political settlements and agreements on arms control at both the regional and global levels.

5. An Agenda for Development

As we approach the 50th Anniversary, we find that the UN's accomplishments in the economic and social sphere receive very mixed reviews. Individual specialized agencies are credited with solid achievements, but dissatisfaction with the system of international development runs deep. A Nordic study found that the UN's development work was marked by "overlapping and duplication of work, limited responsiveness as well as lack of transparency and accountability."

In order to change the system, there must be a sense of urgency about reform. The facts on poverty and inequity should be stimulus enough in themselves: for example, that the income gap between the top 20 per cent and the bottom 20 per cent of the world's population has doubled between 1960 and 1990; or that 50 per cent of Africa's children suffer from chronic malnutrition; or that the net financial flow from the South to the North in the 1980s was as great as the North to South flow in the 1970s.

The gap between Northern and Southern thinking on development may be narrowing; there is increasing evidence of a "pragmatic and non-confrontational approach" taken to reforms. In addition we must take into account the concern for sustainable development, the enhanced awareness of the environmental catastrophes risked by unsustainable development policies in North or South. The impact of expanded international trade on development is profound and the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations opens the door to development strategies based upon larger flows of capital, goods and services. Finally, the very concept of development has evolved away from a preoccupation with capital accumulation and towards a view that gives more place to good gov-

ernance and sustainable human development, and which looks to civil society as much as to the state for initiatives that promote development.

Coordination is the most difficult task faced by any UN reformer in the field on international development. On the surface, the problem seems straightforward. The UN Charter locates responsibility for economic and social matters in ECOSOC which, as we have seen, is described in Chapter X of the Charter. That body, however, has never been as effective as either the General Assembly or the Security Council. While Article 63 gives ECOSOC the right to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies, it specifies that it must do so "through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations." In practice, the independence of the specialized agencies from both ECOSOC and the Secretary-General/Secretariat has been wide indeed. Moreover, any blunt attempt to bring them under a single, central control would undoubtedly fail, for some of the specialized agencies enjoy more support from UN member states than does the UN itself. On the other hand, leaving things as they are means perpetuating the disarray we have already noted.

The Canadian Government should therefore, in cooperation with like-minded governments:

- **Strongly urge the creation within the UN of a Sustainable Development Security Council, a high-level decision-making body with full coordination powers over specialized agencies. It should consult widely, especially with NGOs, on the details of the structure and mandate of such a body. The Canadian Government should present proposals on such a body to the World Social Summit as well as to the appropriate forums of the UN itself. (*See Recommendations 40 and 41*)**

It was also felt that the Canadian Government would be in a much stronger position to press UN reforms in development if it were also to:

- **Establish an International Development Advisory Council composed of individuals with experience and knowledge**

relevant to the effective pursuit of CIDA's humanitarian and development goals. The Council would assist the Government of Canada in formulating development policy; suggest ways of eliminating any discrepancies between commercial and international development policies; and submit an annual report to a parliamentary committee on CIDA's pursuit of its Charter objectives. The Council should also seek to relate humanitarian and development objectives to other aspects of post-conflict peace-building as elaborated in *An Agenda for Peace*. (See Recommendation 39)

6. *An Agenda for Human Rights*

The United Nations was born with an internal contradiction that has never been resolved: its members are states, but its goals are human values. In the light of such divergent pressures, the accomplishments of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights are all the more impressive. The Vienna Declaration stands as a strong endorsement of the basic premises that have underpinned the UN's human rights activities since 1948: "the universal nature of [established international human rights principles] is beyond question"; "the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community"; and "it is the duty of States...to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms".

The Vienna Declaration was subsequently approved at the fall 1993 session of the UN General Assembly, which also adopted a Declaration on Violence Against Women and, most significantly, created the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The mandate of this Commissioner needs to be carefully scrutinized to see how it unfolds because, although the office has considerable potential, the obstacles to its effectiveness are no less substantial.

An important challenge for the High Commissioner will be to encourage basic administrative coherence and efficiency. The UN human rights organs have evolved in *ad hoc*, spasmodic and politically pragmatic ways such that the High Commissioner has inherited what might be described as the antithesis of a system – one that is characterized by lack of coordination, of a rational division of

labour, or of any clear institutional blueprint.

- In developing proposals for an international early warning system for the United Nations, the Government should encourage efforts to coordinate with highly relevant UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees. At this point, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has no information system and needs one.

Canada should press for greater coordination between UN specialized agencies and Secretariat functions over human rights questions. It should urge that the Secretary-General create a high-level task force charged with recommending a series of steps that could be taken across the UN system, plus suggestions as to implementation. The High Commissioner for Human Rights should convene annually a meeting of representatives of all relevant UN specialized agencies to facilitate coordination and the exchange of information. The Government of Canada should press for the rapid implementation of a programme of action for the newly created High Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure an effective UN field presence when human rights are violated or are in jeopardy, including maximizing the use of existing field offices of such agencies as the UNDP and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (*See Recommendation 49*)



Introduction

Why the United Nations?

The human race is currently undergoing the most fundamental and rapid revolution in its history. Its origin and driving force are the enormous and accelerating discovery, spread and use of knowledge, the momentum of which cannot be stopped or its general direction changed. Indeed, it can barely be influenced, even when it produces obvious and avoidable threats like nuclear weapons, unsustainable use of resources, and obscene human inequities, all of which add to the complexity, distortions, pressures and, ultimately, the instability of the international system.

A global challenge of this magnitude and nature is unprecedented. More important, the world's 5.6 billion people, each with his or her own parochial horizons, are divided very untidily among almost 200 sovereign "nation" states. These are the building blocks of global society – and of the United Nations – whether we like it or not. However minuscule or unsustainable, each state is traditionally entitled and expected to think and act selfishly, and do almost exactly as it likes within its own sacrosanct borders. The UN Charter recognizes this: the Organization is comprised of nothing but states – all ostensibly equal – and it is not allowed to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." One of the results of such near anarchy is to generate about 30 violent conflicts at any particular time. The chronically insecure nation states spend trillions of dollars designing and distributing ever more lethal weaponry, and already possess several forms of weapons of mass destruction, which are clearly proliferating.

To complicate matters, the communications revolution has meanwhile also created such a high degree of global interdependence among states that the ability of even the strongest government to control the main lines of its own state's affairs is increasingly constrained. Trans-border mass migrations, pandemics and ecological crises ignore sovereignty. Instant communication via television evokes a global sense

of moral outrage at mass violations of human rights. Swelling demands for humanitarian intervention, haphazard and inconsistent though they may be, give substance to the idea of an international community.

This system of inherent and unguided transformation, anarchy-with-interdependence, and chronic instability makes even the most optimistic aware that there are certain increasingly important global issues that simply must be addressed. The need is more fundamental than problem-solving; it now relates directly to human survival. These issues can only or best be dealt with through organized cooperation among the states, cooperation that is increasingly extensive, effective and well structured. The United Nations system is the only existing global organization. Whatever one's view of the system as it exists, and the sanctity of the sovereign state as we have known it, the "international community" which these states comprise cannot now do without such an organization. The challenge is somehow to improve the present structure as a basis for reducing the worst global problems, and for contributing to the solution of as many others as possible.

What Kind of Reform?

The United Nations structure, with its virtually unamended Charter, is now half-a-century old. It therefore still reflects the perceptions and priorities of drafters mainly concerned with preventing Germany and Japan starting World War III. They did not anticipate the dangerous East-West polarity that dominated and obstructed the UN's security role for 40 years nor the pace of decolonization which has resulted in the admission of over 100 new member states.

Only gradually is the system starting to adjust to its new opportunity to play a primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. In doing so, it finds the structure of international politics very different from that of 1945. The major players, the focus of violence, and the very constituents of state power have changed. Conflicts are rarely between states or even armies; issues and combatants are often ambiguous, if persistently vicious; government falls into total collapse.

The same changes that pose huge new problems for the mainte-

nance of peace and security complicate the protection of human rights and the use of humanitarian intervention. Genocidal attacks, 'ethnic cleansing', slaughter and deliberate starvation affront us each year of the 1990s. From its earliest days, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in later documents, the United Nations has led in the creation of a consensus on the nature of human rights. Nonetheless, an apparatus for consistent protection and effective modes of enforcement of these basic rights still are lacking.

On the economic front, too, the situation is very different. While the extraordinary integration of the global economy, the pre-eminence of knowledge-based activities, and the relative decline in importance of commodity trade all were unexpected, the greatest challenge for the UN system has been to become an efficient source of assistance for the majority of people and states who fear being marginalized by the "post-industrial society". The Charter drafters' main concern was with cleaning up the mess left by World War II. North-South development assistance was the later product of the UN's unexpectedly rapid success in dismantling most of the great colonial empires and creating over 100 new states. With their voting majority, rapidly growing populations and often destitute pre-industrial economies, these new states naturally pressed the UN system – including the Specialized Agencies – in the direction of becoming a massive network for providing multilateral aid of all kinds to the "Third World". This role had not been expected in 1945: the Specialized Agencies were designed primarily for international standard-setting in their own sectors, and even the Bretton Woods organizations were mainly designed to reconstruct Europe and sustain its financial system. Hence the aid-dispensing network was born highly decentralized, and its coordination remains dangerously weak and wasteful.

A fourth current area of particular UN concern, the environment, was not anticipated at all in the Charter; indeed the word is not even mentioned. Even now the subject itself is difficult to define, let alone separate from the UN's other roles while people have very different concepts of what is involved or worthy of priority attention. An unwitting consensus may be developing, however, that all environmental concern has a single element in common. It constitutes a paradigm, a particular way of looking at local, national and global affairs: a consciousness of the physical interdependence of all things.

For the UN system, as the only global body, this imposes a unique and onerous duty – a responsibility for the physical stability and survivability of the world eco-system, including its most disruptive and dangerous species, homo sapiens. For the UN, this duty has many implications, mostly relating to human development activities among both rich and poor. These include population control, sustainable exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable (e.g., desertification, our soil, water and gene heritage, fish and forest resource depletion), and management of wastes (such as CFCs and other greenhouse gases, radioactive residues, acid rain and oil spills). Most of these, like climate change, are global problems, but have been caused mainly by the industrialized countries and now they can be controlled only through expensive cooperation and restraint from the developing world. Moreover, they can best or only be dealt with by the entire international community working collectively through the United Nations. Already, they have been melded into the UN's active role in assisting poorer members through the general adoption of the principle of sustainable development.

Other international issues that have emerged or greatly expanded over the past half-century include: terrorism; drug trafficking (commanding finances greater than the GNPs of most countries); pandemics and their ominous relationship to biological warfare and extortion; high-speed global information, transportation and decision-making systems, with their need for coordination if not control, and their destabilizing social implications; the production and dissemination of vast quantities of highly lethal weaponry; instant trans-global financial transfers (\$1 trillion a day); extra- or supra-national corporations with global service, manufacturing and sales networks; and – most tragic of all – the dangerous division of the world into “haves” and “have-nots”. All these issues can only or best be dealt with by a universal body, the UN system, yet again none was properly anticipated in the Charter.

The number, scale and novelty of all these issues make it clear that they cannot be dealt with simply by “reforming” the UN system in the narrow sense of improving its procedures or creating new or modified institutions. The system as a system must be fundamentally adapted to new circumstances.

An Agenda for the Reform of the UN System

If the United Nations is to become the main instrument for building a peaceful and more equitable world, it must command belief in its effectiveness. As its functions expand, its form must be equal to the new or more intensified tasks it is asked to undertake.

The most obvious means of carrying out major changes in the UN is to amend the Charter, particularly in light of its creation under and for very different circumstances. However, this will in fact be quite difficult. Not only have every member country, and most Secretariat officials involved, developed vested interests and preferences, but the process itself is complex.

First, there is not just the UN's own Charter involved, but also the quite independent charters of the 'specialized agencies', including such Bretton Woods institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Many important reforms relating to system-wide coordination can be implemented only following separate amendment of up to 20 charters or statutes.

Second, the UN Charter itself can be amended only if two-thirds of the membership, including each of the five permanent members of the Security Council, agree. Given the chronic differences in attitude and priority between the rich and poor members, this majority may often be difficult to find. More important, any amendment can be vetoed by any of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Successful Charter amendments are likely to consist of very carefully constructed 'package deals' that balance gains and losses.

This chapter will concentrate on four core elements of the UN system: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. Although, where possible, reforms will be proposed that do not require Charter amendment, in some cases such as the Security Council, it cannot be avoided. Finally, Canadian positions will be suggested on UN finances and non-state participation in UN affairs.

General Assembly

The General Assembly is the core of the UN system. It brings together all of the member states. Occupying a seat on its floor has come to symbolize, as does nothing else, equal partnership in a global community. During the course of de-colonization, and more recently with the break-up of Central and Eastern European states, numbers in the General Assembly have grown from the original 50 to 184 countries. From the states of the South particularly, opposition must be expected to any UN reforms which seem to shift power from the General Assembly to any other part of the UN. As its capacity to take decisions increases with the decline in East-West polarization, it becomes more important than ever to look to General Assembly procedures and the way it organizes its work.

Australia's Peter Wilensky, among others, has called for longer-term planning of the General Assembly's agenda so that "each session could deal substantively with one or two major issues on which a properly prepared declaration or convention could be adopted." Since, with a change in this direction, agenda-setting would become crucially important, a planning committee of the whole would be needed. Such a committee might be especially desirable if inputs could be made directly to it not only by member states and the Secretariat, but also from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Simply as a way of giving substance to "We the Peoples", the creation of such a planning committee merits close attention.

Simplification of the main committee structure is overdue and a beginning was made at the 47th Session of the General Assembly by reducing the number of main committees from seven to six. Special attention is required to give coherence to the agenda of the Special Political Committee and to reducing the repetition of debate in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (which already has 54 members) and the Third Committee. It is therefore recommended that:

- 1. Canada work to strengthen the General Assembly by a simplification of its procedures and improvement of its organization and planning; in particular, Canada should propose an agenda-planning process for the General Assembly**

that would permit NGOs, as well as member states and the Secretariat, to make an input.

The Security Council

Reform of the Security Council is pressing for two reasons: first, its permanent membership no longer reflects the reality of global power; secondly, its credibility as an impartial intervenor in situations that threaten common security is undermined by the disproportionate influence within it of Northern, and especially North Atlantic, states. The significance of these shortcomings in the Security Council is magnified by the fact that, alone among UN bodies, its decisions are binding on all member states.

At some future time, the distinctions between permanent and non-permanent members, members with and without a veto, deserve to be eliminated. That time, it is generally agreed, is not yet. Nevertheless, proposals for interim steps that might help have accumulated in great number and variety since the General Assembly, in December 1992, invited all member states to submit written comments on the membership of the Security Council. If, as the Secretary-General still hopes, a partial reform of the Security Council is still possible for the 50th Anniversary, intensive negotiations will take place, and compromises will have to be reached. Canada, as an active member of the Open-ended Working Group on the Reform of the Council, will have a vital role to play in these negotiations. Rather than adopting a fixed position, it is recommended that Canada should follow these guidelines:

2. Support an increase in the number of Security Council members up to 21 members (from the current 15).

3. Agree to an increase in the number of permanent seats for developed countries only if permanent seats are added for three states from the South.

4. Work for reduction in the significance of the veto power by such means as: (a) denying the veto power to new mem-

bers of the Security Council; or (b) making the veto valid only if exercised by three permanent members rather than, as at present, any one permanent member; (c) and/or limiting the kinds of issues on which the veto can be exercised (at a minimum, the veto over amendments to the Charter and the appointment of the Secretary-General should go); and/or (d) establishing new majorities for passage of categories of Security Council resolutions to replace the general veto for permanent members.

5. Support the principle of a fixed proportion of the seats on the Security Council coming from the South.

Recently, informal procedures employed by the Security Council have led to concern over management by the permanent five (P5), or even more narrowly, a “steering committee” of the US, the UK and France. These perceived trends reinforce worries over the increase in closed sessions of the Security Council or parts of it. The need for private discussion will always have to be accommodated, but as a general principle:

6. Canada should support greater transparency in the operations of the Security Council and more detailed reports to the General Assembly.

The vast increase in the volume of work and of agreed action in the Security Council has provoked questions about the criteria used to determine whether or not to intervene when there is a threat to the peace. It has been suggested that there is tolerable and intolerable selectivity. Council action based solely on calculations of national interest is not tolerable, while selectivity based on a realistic understanding that the Council cannot do everything is tolerable, though regrettable.

To increase the credibility of Council decisions both to intervene and to terminate an intervention, steps could be taken to improve the quality and impartiality of advice provided to the Council. Consid-

eration should thus be given to the creation, by the Security Council, of advisory panels made up of persons of accepted integrity with a deep knowledge of the background conditions of the threats to the peace under consideration. Such panels should be made available to provide advice and exchange information and views with the Council in a matter of hours, if necessary by electronic means, backed up by the best strategic and tactical information UN members and the Secretariat are willing and able to offer. With these problems in mind, it is recommended that:

7. Canada should propose means by which the impartiality and consistency of Security Council decisions would be increased, including the use of advisory panels.

In sum, and to cite *The Economist* (22 August 1992): "If the United Nations is the world's voice, its Security Council must be seen to be more than a western clique."

Reform of the Secretariat

Proposals for the reform of the UN Secretariat range from general principles to the most minute detail. We can touch briefly on only a few: the selection of the Secretary-General and senior officials; intellectual leadership; organizational simplification; and coordination. For the most part, reforms to the Secretariat do not require amendments to the Charter. They therefore should be implemented more readily; in fact, they encounter entrenched resistance that is often nearly as strong as a P5 veto.

If a Canadian University president were selected in the same haphazard fashion as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, there would be a national scandal. The same applies for the senior officers of the UN, the Under Secretaries-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General. A General Assembly resolution (46/467), debated on 20 December 1991 and later adopted, called for public notification of senior vacancies, widespread advertising for candidates, improved representation of women, and an end to the practice of nomination by a particular government. Yet, in spite of it, the new Secre-

tary-General named ten Under-Secretaries in early 1992, giving five of the positions to nationals of each of the permanent five, appointing no women, and generally using selection techniques that totally lacked transparency. It is therefore urged that:

8. Canada should press for the use of open, competitive search and selection methods for the appointment of the Secretary-General and senior UN officers, and should support policies to ensure gender equity at all levels.

The quality of UN officials is, selection methods notwithstanding, often very high. The degree to which these officials are able to give free rein to their abilities, particularly in providing analytic, critical, policy statements, is much more limited. Prickly responses to open or implied criticism from member states and lack of encouragement from many former Secretary-Generals, have led to the practice of preparing documents for meetings and conferences that, in the words of one critic (which will ring true to any frequent reader of UN documents), are “bland, turgid, and voluminous.” One must agree with former Under-Secretary General Brian Urquhart that “intellectual leadership and the generation and following-up of new ideas are an urgent necessity.” Much of that leadership could and should come from the senior ranks of the UN Secretariat. We therefore recommend that:

9. Canada lend strong support to senior UN civil servants who contribute critical analysis and encourage them in the generation of ideas for an improved international order.

By the end of 1991, there was widespread agreement that a proliferation of offices and departments had occurred and that remedial action was needed. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali acted quickly. Fourteen senior offices were abolished, the number of officials who reported directly to the Secretary-General was reduced from 30 to 10, and Departments were cut to six. Reorganization of the Secretariat in 1993, however, saw the creation of three new de-

partments in the economic and social sectors, in anticipation of the renewed international development thrust. Most observers believe that UN management is still far from satisfactory and the suggestion that the Secretary-General appoint a strong deputy to take charge of internal reform may have merit. We recommend that:

10. Canada give strong support to simplification and strengthening of the organization of the UN Secretariat.

Coordination problems will be flagged in the sections of this paper dealing with peace-building, human rights and, especially, development. They arise particularly in the relations among specialized agencies and between specialized agencies and the Secretariat. A former senior UN official, Erskine Childers, recently gave the poignant example of two decades' achievement by the UNDP and UNESCO in training over one million teachers being undermined by IMF structural adjustment grant conditions that led to the dismissal of thousands of these same teachers. The level of coordination provided by the toothless Administrative Committee on Coordination does little to modify agency autonomy. Yet the onus for coordination lies not only on the UN system, but also on member states, which do not ensure that their representatives on the governing bodies of specialized agencies support policies that are consonant with overall policy towards the UN and consistent one with another. It is therefore urged that:

11. Canada redouble its efforts to assure consistency and coordination in the policies it supports in all aspects of the UN's work and especially in the specialized agencies of the UN.

The International Court of Justice

Founded in 1946, the International Court of Justice is the successor body to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Its contributions to the development of an international rule of law have been considerable, but its influence is limited by the unwillingness of most

UN member states to submit to the limitation on sovereignty that a full acceptance of its jurisdiction implies.

Only disputes between states come before the ICJ, but its views affect a wider range of subjects through the advisory opinions it delivers at the request of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other UN organs and specialized agencies. Its ability to provide settlements to disputes that might otherwise escalate to the point of war is proven. Furthermore, it has served to put weaker states on a par with much more powerful ones, as in the 1984 decision in *Nicaragua v. United States*. Strengthening and expanding the jurisdiction of the court in inter-state disputes is an important way of promoting common security. We therefore recommend that:

12. Canada work with like-minded states to increase the number of member states that accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), support the inclusion of provisions for referral of disputes to the ICJ in all treaties, and encourage the submission of differences to the ICJ by special agreement.

The development of an international justice system would be greatly advanced if a court were created with powers applying to individuals and corporate bodies rather than to states only. The creation of *ad hoc* war crimes tribunals, such as that operating now in ex-Yugoslavia, would be unnecessary if a permanent court existed. International crimes – drug-trafficking, international prostitution, the illicit arms trade, illegal disposal of wastes and other acts on environmental pollution – call for a world criminal court. We therefore urge that:

13. Canada work towards the establishment of an International Court of Criminal Jurisdiction.

Finances

Both the revenues and expenditures of the UN need attention. It

is gratifying that Canada has never been in arrears in either its regular or peace-keeping payments to the UN. Unfortunately, the record of many other states is quite different. The end of 1992 saw 87 states in arrears, led by the UN's host country, the United States, which still owed \$240 million in arrears to the UN's regular budget. The Volcker-Ogata report on *Financing an Effective United Nations* (1993) regards the full and prompt payment of assessed UN dues as fundamental to the health of the UN, a body that cannot borrow, and which, they recommend, should not be able to borrow. At present, UN rules under Article 19 of the Charter deny voting rights to any member state that is two years in arrears, but this restriction has rarely, if ever, been enforced. Were it no more than a signal of the importance attached to prompt payment, we recommend that:

14. Canada should propose that Article 19 of the UN Charter, which states that a member state that is two years in arrears shall lose its voting rights, should be enforced.

For some time in the future, it is likely that assessments and voluntary contributions will provide the lion's share of UN revenues, and indeed this is recommended by the somewhat conservative Volcker-Ogata report. Nevertheless, a commitment to explore the possibility of using international taxation as a supplemental source of UN revenues would be timely. We therefore urge that:

15. Canada commit itself to explore with like-minded states the feasibility of providing independent revenue sources for the UN and raising UN revenues through international taxation of arms sales, the production of hydrocarbon fuels, airline and shipping traffic and/or similarly appropriate transactions.

The expenditures of the United Nations are undoubtedly made with the same level of control and effective management as most of the better-run member states. That does not mean that they are not

in need of improvement – far from it. William Barton, a former Canadian ambassador to the UN, has made three important recommendations that the Canadian government would do well to take up. It is therefore urged that:

16. Canada should renew its support, first given in 1979, for value-for-money auditing; for the appointment of an Auditor-General for the UN, with a five-year contract, appointed by and accountable to the General Assembly; and for the parallel creation of an internal management review system accountable to the Secretary-General.

Democratization

At present, the UN is made up exclusively of states. Yet the words of its preamble, “We the Peoples” point to a future in which elements of civil society are also given a place in the international system.

The Government of Canada has an excellent record on supporting the participation of NGOs, both national and international, in the work of the UN and especially in the international development and human rights sectors. We recommend that:

17. Canada should continue to give its utmost support to the participation of NGOs in the work of the United Nations and to ensure that, throughout the UN system, NGOs have the right to have written reports translated and circulated as UN documents within existing rules; the right to make oral presentations; the right to make additions to agendas; and the right to make inputs into negotiations.

How to decide among the thousands of NGOs which will have access to organs and conferences of the UN is still a matter for negotiation and debate. Nevertheless, we urge that:

18. Canada work for a predictable and transparent process for accrediting NGOs to the UN.

Reform should also involve an effort to have the UN represent in some way the parliaments and peoples of the world in addition to the governments of the sovereign nation states. We have seen the European Community evolve with a parliament which is now directly elected. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has also organized a parliamentary assembly. It is time to incorporate structures which would permit a similar evolution of the United Nations. Consequently:

19. The Government and Parliament of Canada should look favourably on and seek to encourage proposals for the addition of a UN Parliamentary Assembly to the United Nations Organization.

An Agenda for Peace

A recent article in *The New York Times* by a former senior UN official posed a series of questions about the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.

What is the responsibility of United Nations members for disasters like Rwanda and Bosnia that do not directly affect their national security and other interests? In fact, is there an international responsibility that arises from membership in the UN?

Under what legal authority can an international organization assume quasi-government responsibilities in failed states, of which there is a lengthening list?

Except when there is a clear case of aggression, are there any circumstances in which an international force should take sides or fight in a civil war? If so, who is to do the fighting?...¹

The UN faces a dilemma. The expectations of the public for the world body grow with every fresh disaster. Yet the UN's capacity to respond effectively is constrained by a hundred practical shortcomings and fundamentally circumscribed by the reluctance and hesitations of the member states which comprise the organization and which appear not to support a more effective role.

Partly, in an effort to break through this impasse, the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 pursuant to a request from the first and only Summit Meeting of the Security Council for an analysis of potential international capabilities in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. This document has set off a worldwide round of reflection and debate. Canadians in particular, however, have been keen to do their part to move the organization beyond debate to action that would dramatically improve UN capacities. The following analysis and recommendations are offered in this spirit.

¹ Brian Urquhart, "Whose Fight Is It?", *The New York Times*, May 22, 1994.

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

The United Nations has a role of paramount importance to play in preventing conflict from breaking out. *An Agenda for Peace* laid emphasis on preventive diplomacy – the essence of which is improved information gathering and analysis – and, so too, did the General Assembly debate on the document, culminating in December 1992 with the adoption of Resolution 47/120. It detailed steps that might be taken to improve preventive diplomacy, including:

- more timely and better information on potential conflicts;
- improved Secretariat capability to analyze such information, including the establishment of an early warning centre;
- better training for Secretariat officials and the increased availability of outside experts;
- better coordination of activities by UN agencies and cooperation with regional organizations.

Conceptually, peacemaking – action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through peaceful means – is distinct from preventive diplomacy – action to prevent disputes from arising between parties. In practice, however, the techniques are similar and, perhaps as a consequence, peacemaking through peaceful means under Chapter VI of the Charter has received little separate attention.

The principal recommendations on peacemaking have related to greater use of the World Court, the application of economic sanctions, including support to innocent states incurring special economic problems as a result of sanctions, and amelioration of potential conflict through social and economic assistance. In the latter case, there is a critical need for effective coordination among the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping as well as other UN agencies since there is a clear relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. Unfortunately, many questions persist concerning such coordination and hence the efficacy of the UN's humanitarian assistance efforts.

Accordingly, Canadian policy on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking should stress the following:

20. The provision to the Secretary-General of a list of individuals, ranging from prominent Canadians to technical personnel, available in principle to undertake fact-finding and provide good offices.

21. A specific proposal on preventive diplomacy in conjunction with like-minded Member States.

22. A specific proposal on the requirements of an early warning system. Such a system should include data on humanitarian crises and serve the Department of Humanitarian Affairs since there is a clear need to coordinate humanitarian assistance efforts with peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. To this end, Canada should support an independent investigation of the UN's capabilities for humanitarian assistance in the light of the Somalia experience and with a view to improving such coordination.

23. Support also should be given to the provision of national intelligence information to the UN, with appropriate safeguards to prevent excessive intrusion into the internal affairs of states, and to a policy analysis unit in the Secretariat.

Peace-keeping

An Agenda for Peace made a number of specific recommendations designed to improve the conduct of peace-keeping operations. These included a renewed effort to persuade Member States to identify stand-by forces for UN peace-keeping, improved training for peace-keeping personnel, the strengthening of the military staff at the United Nations, and plans for the rapid expansion of management capabilities as peace-keeping operations required. The report also sought to improve the financing of peace-keeping operations.

The Department of Peace-keeping Operations has been strengthened, but it remains stretched to the limit in the management of peace-

keeping operations involving around 100,000 personnel serving under the UN flag. A limited situation room has been set up, but a more sophisticated Situation Centre would help tie together the activities of the Departments of Peace-keeping Operations, Humanitarian Affairs, and Political Affairs. This could lead to a combined operations centre responsible for both operational planning and supervision of peace-keeping operations and linked to an early warning system.

Canadian policy has long emphasized improvements in the conduct of peace-keeping operations. Building on the establishment of the situation centre and the strengthening of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, Canadian officials now seek a much more capable Department able to provide the strategic headquarters for several large, multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations.

This would require a radical reorganization of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations along traditional functional lines. It also suggests a middle-of-the-road approach to the future of peace-keeping, one in which the United Nations would be organized to deal with complex peace-keeping operations, perhaps of the size of Cambodia, but not to conduct full-scale enforcement actions, thereby excluding not only Gulf-style operations, but also the lesser scale operations (say, 50-100,000 personnel) of the kind earlier envisaged in the former Yugoslavia.

Current Canadian policy also places considerably greater emphasis than previously on the importance of training and education to ensure the maximum compatibility of different national contingents serving in UN forces. Specifically, a UN staff college would offer the prospect of bringing together in a single educational programme all of the professional skills – soldiering, policing, human rights and election monitoring, humanitarian relief – which now characterize multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations.

24. Canada should further refine and promote earlier proposals to improve the conduct of peace-keeping operations, including the creation of a combined operations centre and a UN Staff College offering an integrated approach that reflects the multi-dimensional character

of the new generation of UN peace-keeping.

Canada should also consider increasing the number of forces it earmarks officially for stand-by service in peace-keeping operations. The current figure is 2,000, but the actual numbers have been well beyond that. It might be more realistic, therefore, to double the number to 4,000, which is certainly more in keeping with our current commitments.

Peace Enforcement

When should the armed force of the UN be used? One answer, based on Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter, is: when all other means have been exhausted. The other means include:

- a) the arsenal of preventive diplomacy – “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements” (Article 33);
- b) the application of such non-military sanctions as the breaking of communications and economic relations (Article 41); and
- c) conventional peace-keeping efforts.

When all these have failed or when they are deemed inappropriate, then stronger measures must be considered. This is the domain between peace-keeping and outright war-making (as exemplified in the Persian Gulf operation) – when military force is brought to bear not to defeat but to neutralize local forces in order to persuade combatants that their only alternative is to reach a negotiated settlement. Yet in order to achieve such an outcome, the international forces must be militarily credible.

An Agenda for Peace proposed that special forces – peace enforcement units – be constituted in situations of high risk. Peace enforcement units, therefore, would be a mid-point between traditional UN peace-keeping and Chapter VII style enforcement actions. The Secretary-General has since clarified that he had in mind a standby quick reaction force composed of national elements, which in turn would be based on volunteers from the regu-

lar units of national military forces.

In May 1993, the Security Council issued a statement on peace-keeping in which it set out a specific set of operational principles. The Council statement clearly indicated that force could be used against a party defying the UN mandate. It also allowed a slight opening to the Secretary-General's definition of peace-keeping ("hitherto with the consent of the parties") by allowing that there might be "exceptional circumstances" in which the consent of the parties was not a pre-requisite for a peace-keeping operation.

Even though the political climate is not currently receptive, it is important for Canada to examine this concept. The proposal for a UN standby force able to deploy quickly is closely linked to both early warning and preventive deployments whereby a potential conflict is deterred or contained through an early UN presence in the field.

Official Canadian statements have invariably emphasized the need for international action prior to the point where bloodshed hardens the attitudes of the parties. The exploration of the requirements for a UN quick reaction force and possible Canadian commitments thereto is a logical extension of the Canadian approach.

25. The Government of Canada should press for the creation of international peace enforcement units to be deployed either as a quick reaction force or in other situations of high risk. It should immediately offer a Canadian contribution to such units. These troops, to be drawn on a volunteer basis from among both regular and reserve personnel of the Canadian Forces, would be more heavily armed and could undertake a variety of tasks from providing protection for humanitarian relief work to securing ceasefire lines.

In the longer-term, Canada should work toward the creation of a UN-controlled volunteer force under the exclusive authority of the Security Council and under the day-to-day direction of the Secretary-General.

Canada may want to consider making such a commitment conditional on the achievement of certain structural reforms of the Security Council. No system of collective security can be expected to have universal coverage. But once resort to arms is considered, the problem of consistent or at least non-discriminatory criteria for intervention becomes paramount. If the Security Council is to avoid the risk of seeing Third World confidence in the UN melt away, it must look to ways of developing an invulnerable reputation for impartiality and coherence in its interventionary policy. An obvious step toward greater legitimacy in this respect would be to refashion the membership of the Security Council.

Post-Conflict Peace-building

In *An Agenda for Peace*, peace-building seemed to have two dimensions. First, it referred to actions in the immediate aftermath of conflict – de-mining, the restoration of government, the supervision of elections – to aid countries damaged by war. Second, and more profoundly, it drew attention to the need for long-term development as a solution to the renewal of conflict. The report went even further in asserting the linkage between peace and democracy: “There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.”

In April 1993 the Security Council issued a statement on peace-building which was broadly supportive of the recommendations in *An Agenda for Peace*. The Council endorsement of peace-building, however, was long on encouragement but short on specific measures which might produce a coordinated response to post-conflict reconstruction.

Post-conflict peace-building focuses attention on the non-military elements in peace-keeping and peacemaking. Peace-building requires the coordination of the military aspects of peace-keeping with aid policy, election monitoring, human rights policies, police training, and the range of development and humanitarian relief programmes provided by NGOs. Although some progress may have been made in assimilating the experience of these various groups in past peace-keeping operations, there is not yet a coordinated Cana-

dian policy, or a process for bringing together the various agencies who would be involved in post-conflict peace-building.

26. Canada should seek to coordinate its policy concerning peace-building, with emphasis on the integrated programmes that would be needed at both the national and the international level. A new governmental mechanism should be contemplated, one that draws its personnel from all the relevant departments, such as Foreign Affairs, DND, CIDA, Elections Canada, the RCMP and so forth.

27. Canada should also encourage the international community to explore the possibility of providing a "framework of governance" in cases of "failed nation states", which Somalia exemplifies. States that fail to maintain order or that engage in repression or other behaviour judged contrary to international norms by the international community would be compelled to accept a political receivership whereby the state would be helped to restructure its political system and to maintain order during a transitional period. Such a framework would have to be carefully constructed so as to ensure: that efficiency and cost-effectiveness would be at a premium since the costs of such an undertaking could be enormous as the commitment could be expected to be fairly long term, even if transitional; and that the most appropriate mechanism within the UN be utilized to these ends.

ARMS PROLIFERATION AND CONTROLS

There were many aspects of international peace and security which *An Agenda for Peace* did not address or touched only in very cursory fashion. One of the most threatening is the entire area of weapons proliferation. Indeed, on 31 January 1992, the same Security Council meeting of Heads of State and Government which commissioned the Secretary-General to prepare *An Agenda for Peace* also declared its intention to prevent the spread of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear Proliferation

Urgent attention should be paid to nuclear proliferation now. North Korea's 1993 decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, South Africa's announcement that it had built and subsequently dismantled six nuclear weapons, uncertainty over the future of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, combined with suspicions about nuclear programmes elsewhere in the world – all demonstrate that nuclear proliferation must be high on the international agenda.

At the same time, when all the cuts in strategic weapons agreed to in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) are implemented in 2003, the number of nuclear weapons held either by the United States or Russia will still total 11,875 – plus another 1,300 held by the other three declared nuclear powers – the United Kingdom, France and China. This remains a grotesque number of warheads to be retained in nuclear arsenals around the world by any standard. They are a threat of terrifying proportions and an affront to the non-nuclear world. There is great concern that without tighter nuclear controls, a nuclear proliferation “cascade” could occur whereby countries, anxious for their security, reconsider their non-nuclear status and contribute to both horizontal and vertical proliferation.²

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT entered into force in 1970 and there are currently 164 parties to it. Under the NPT, nuclear weapons states undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or to facilitate their acquisition by non-nuclear weapons states. The latter undertake not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and not to receive any assistance in this field. At the same time, the treaty enshrines the right of all parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while nuclear weapons states undertake to pursue negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament.

The NPT commits parties to accept safeguards on their own use

² Horizontal proliferation is an increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons. Vertical proliferation is an increase in the arsenals of those nations already possessing nuclear weapons.

of nuclear material and on transfers of such materials under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Non-nuclear weapons states have to conclude with the Agency a safeguards agreement designed to reveal any diversion of such products from civil programmes for military purposes. Parties to the treaty also undertake not to export to non-nuclear weapons states such products or materials, or equipment or materials intended for the processing, use or production of special fissile products unless those items are subject to IAEA safeguards.

Following the discovery of Iraq's progress towards building nuclear weapons despite IAEA safeguards, changes were made whereby the IAEA can now conduct special inspections at any facilities, declared or not, in a nation with a full-scope safeguards agreement and it can mount such inspections on the basis of information provided by other member nations. Full-scope safeguards give the IAEA the right to verify *all* nuclear material in the relevant state and to apply safeguards to *all* peaceful nuclear activities within the state. In the final analysis, the state would be obliged to permit an inspection to take place. If the inspections are frustrated, the IAEA is able to refer the matter to the UN Security Council as has happened with North Korea.

NPT review conferences have been held every five years ever since the NPT entered into force. In 1995, however, in accordance with the Treaty, the NPT *renewal* conference will take place. It will determine whether the treaty should remain in force indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods. In all likelihood, the treaty states will agree to its extension. A major complaint at NPT review conferences in the past, however, has been the failure of the declared nuclear weapons nations to produce a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. The non-nuclear weapons nations see a ban on nuclear testing as one of the key yardsticks for determining whether the nuclear weapons nations are actually fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

28. The Government of Canada should continue to press for early conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty relating to nuclear weapons tests in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

29. The Government should continue to press for further major reductions in strategic arms beyond the levels negotiated in the START II Treaty. A worthy initial goal would be to reduce the nuclear stocks of the United States and Russia to no more than 250 weapons each – in other words, both countries should adopt policies of minimum deterrence.

30. The Government of Canada should support indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 NPT renewal conference, in such a way that the elimination of nuclear weapons in a specified time frame is committed to by the nuclear weapons states.

The Chemical Weapons Convention

In January 1993, after years of negotiations, 130 nations signed a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Paris following its adoption by the UN General Assembly; a further 17 have signed subsequently. The CWC is the most ambitious multilateral arms control agreement ever. It seeks a global ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons – an entire class of weaponry. It requires all parties to declare and destroy all their chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities which will require verification of one of the world's most pervasive industrial sectors. The total number of chemical facilities to be monitored may reach 10,000.

Nevertheless, the entry into force of this Convention – six months after it has been signed and ratified by 65 nations – seems assured in view of the widespread support for it in the United Nations. Yet there is a critical need to persuade those nations which may covertly possess chemical weapons to join the Convention. It may therefore be appropriate for the parties to the Convention to examine harsher and more specific sanctions against nations outside the Convention. These could include broader trade embargoes as well as restrictions on aid and credit.

31. The Government of Canada, together with like-minded member states of the United Nations, should consider re-

stricting aid and/or credit to nations which refuse to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The government should also press for multilateral agreement on mandatory sanctions in cases where the Chemical Weapons Convention is violated or when there is refusal to cooperate with verification measures.

The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975 and currently has 134 state parties. The BWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin agents with military applications, but it has always been considered a confidence-building measure rather than a watertight arms control treaty because biological warfare activities are extremely difficult to verify. Essentially, any modern biological laboratory could produce weapons agents in militarily useful quantities; hence there are no verification provisions. However, in September 1993, an expert group proposed 20 steps which might be applied, including exchange visits by scientists, the monitoring of journals, and the screening of researchers for particular antibodies. It was acknowledged that no measures would be completely effective but nations are now studying the expert group's recommendations.

32. The Government of Canada should press for some sort of verification regime for the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention sufficiently effective so as not to create a false sense of security. A compromise might be to introduce an agreement on "compliance assurance" rather than "verification" in order to avoid the suggestion that compliance could be completely guaranteed.

Conventional Arms Exports Regimes

In today's strategic climate, there is a consensus among the former Cold War adversaries on the need for a more systematic, international approach to restrictions on arms sales so as to prevent regional arms races and limit the consequences of regional instability.

Unfortunately, agreeing on the principle of arms export restraint is far easier than putting it into practice.

On 9 December 1991 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/36L entitled "Transparency in Armaments" which formally established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This requested member nations to provide data regarding certain categories of arms exports and imports by April 1993. These categories were battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems.

The Register is viewed as an "early warning device" which will provide advanced notice of nations and regions where a potentially destabilizing build-up of armaments is taking place. It is intended to establish a universal and non-discriminating repository of data and information. No verification provisions are included in the Register but entries can be cross-checked to see if declared imports by one nation tally with exports from others.

The Secretary-General released the first report of the Register on 11 October 1993 – for arms delivered in 1992 – by which time 80 states had reported of the 186 that had been invited to do so. However, a recent assessment by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicated that the first report managed to cover 98 per cent of total exports, although only 65 per cent of total imports.

Nevertheless, the Register has been criticised for being far too general in that it does not require specific types of weapons to be identified. It is expected, for instance, that there will be an agreement to list national holdings of equipment and procurement efforts so that the Register will provide a more useful account of national inventories and plans. Genuine transparency requires knowing what a state is holding and acquiring, not merely what it is importing. The best estimate is that only between 20-25 per cent of arms production is traded internationally; the rest is procured by their producer.

There is also likely to be pressure to include transfers of small arms, mortars, land-mines and man-portable systems which play important roles in combat but which receive little attention. Other new categories which might be incorporated include airborne command and control

systems, long-range surveillance and target acquisition systems, and electronic equipment intended to suppress air defences.

33. There are three ways in which Canada should seek to improve the UN's Register of Conventional Arms:

a) universal reporting by all member states should be strongly encouraged;

b) other arms-supplying countries should be encouraged to prohibit sales to countries which do not report to the UN Register; and

c) definitions should be improved and the scope of the Register enlarged to include domestic procurement and national holdings so as to give a true picture of military capabilities.

34. Finally, Canada should prohibit arms sales to countries which do not report fully to the UN Register, or which are subject to UN embargoes.

35. Canada should pursue arrangements at the United Nations and in other appropriate bodies with a view to creating both global and regional conventional arms control regimes and a UN verification agency. In particular, Canada should encourage the process by offering its expertise on arms control and verification.

* * * * *

The fundamental problem with respect to weapons proliferation is that export controls are not the solution to solving regional conflicts. Export controls can slow down regional arms races and delay or even prevent the acquisition of some of the most threatening weaponry. Yet if nations feel threatened militarily, they will seek to enhance their security by acquiring whatever armaments they can. The most effective means of curbing the trade in arms will be by seeking political settlements and agreements on arms control at both the regional and global levels.

An Agenda for Development

The Charter of the United Nations expresses the determination of “We the Peoples ... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.” Furthermore, in Chapter IX on “International Economic and Social Cooperation” it pledges the UN to promote “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.” Chapter X is devoted to the Economic and Social Council.

The intentions of the founders are thus clear. But as we approach the 50th Anniversary, we find that the UN’s accomplishments in the economic and social sphere receive very mixed reviews. Individual specialized agencies are credited with solid achievements, but dissatisfaction with the system of international development runs deep. Kenneth Dadzie, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, cites with approval a 1985 critique that found individual sector programmes conceptually disparate, fragmented, lacking in analytic and functional integration, devoid of a sense of priority, and prone to waste through duplication of effort. These programmes operated within an “unmanageable intergovernmental negotiating and decision-making apparatus” lacking in “systematic resource allocation procedures and effective accountability mechanisms.” Although this judgment is nearly ten years old, and the Secretary-General has since then reduced the number of posts in development in the Secretariat and begun reorganization, much that was criticized still remains to be redressed. The Nordic countries project for reform in development of 1991 reiterated much of the earlier assessment. It found that the UN’s development work was marked by “overlapping and duplication of work, limited responsiveness as well as lack of transparency and accountability.”

The rejuvenation brought on by the end of the Cold War did not pass by the UN’s vast development jurisdiction, although peace and security concerns retained their primacy. The Nordic countries’ project inspired ECOSOC to tackle reorganization of the develop-

ment machine in 1992 and although it was unable to reach agreement on the report of its Working Group a year later, the impetus for change was renewed in other ways. In December 1992, the General Assembly called on the Secretary-General to prepare a report that was soon labelled, by Boutros Boutros-Ghali himself, *An Agenda for Development*. Released in late May, it can be expected to arouse the same kind of debate that *An Agenda for Peace* provoked. In the meanwhile, preparations for the World Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) gather momentum, as do those for the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, September 1994) and the Fourth World Conference of Women (Beijing, 1995).

Promising as this activity may be, it will have little effect unless it is backed by a will for reform – indeed a sense of urgency about reform. It is true that much has already been accomplished in improving the basic quality of life in the South: food production has doubled in India since the 1960s; small pox has been eradicated and world-wide deaths from measles cut from 2.5 million to just over one million. Nevertheless, much more remains to be done; indeed, since the late 1970s, there have been severe reversals in many countries. Fifty per cent of African children now suffer from chronic malnutrition and the gap between the income share of the top 20 per cent of the world's population doubled between 1960 and 1990. Equally disturbing, the net financial flow from the South to the North in the 1980s was as great as the North to South flow in the 1970s, and it is now widely recognized that the structural adjustments, demanded by major international financial institutions, imposed extraordinarily high social costs on the poorest citizens of many less developed countries. Clearly, both development policy and development administration urgently need reform.

The search for new common ground between North and South is aided by the fact that poverty, unemployment and a lack of social integration, the three themes of the Social Summit, resonate in North and South alike, especially since the onset of the 1989 recession. That the gap between Northern and Southern thinking on development may be narrowing is also suggested by UNCTAD's Cartagena meetings in 1992 and by, in the Secretary-General's words, the "pragmatic and non-confrontational approach" taken there to reforms. In

addition we must take into account the concern for sustainable development, the enhanced awareness of the environmental catastrophes risked by unsustainable development policies in North or South. The impact of expanded international trade on development is profound and the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations opens the door to development strategies based upon larger flows of capital, goods and services. Finally, the very concept of development has evolved away from a preoccupation with capital accumulation and towards a view that gives more place to good governance and sustainable human development, and which looks to civil society as much as to the state for initiatives that promote development.

Canadian Leadership

Whether these forces for positive changes will prove strong enough to break through the inertia of past practice remains to be seen, but the question must be asked: What can Canada do to encourage and help shape the forces for UN reform in the field of international development?

Perhaps the first step we should take is to re-position ourselves for maximum credibility in a leadership role. We already have a strong position, but we can reinforce it greatly by making sure that our domestic policies are consonant with the reforms we believe are necessary within the UN system. In 1987, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade produced a report on Canada's official development assistance (ODA) policies and programmes, entitled *For Whose Benefit?* and commonly known as the Winegard Report. Were the Canadian government to act on the major recommendations of the Winegard Report, Canada's role as a proponent of UN reform would gain great solidity.

The Canadian Government should therefore:

36. Place before Parliament a Development Assistance Charter that makes humanitarian and development objectives, focused on the poorest countries and peoples, the primary determinant of Canadian aid policies.

37. By statute, establish 0.7 per cent of GNP as a minimum for ODA.

It may, at first sight, seem paradoxical to affirm the interconnection between trade and aid in any viable international development strategy and, at the same time, to call for the insulation of CIDA from Canadian trade and commercial pressures. The seeming contradiction disappears if CIDA is deemed to act in the interest of common international development that is also Canada's long-run interest, while other ministries look primarily to the shorter-run interest of Canadian traders and producers. That the two perspectives should interact is entirely advisable; that the short run should dominate the long run is not. It is therefore consonant with Canada's most effective role in UN reform that the Canadian Government:

38. Assure the administrative and policy independence of CIDA operating under a legislated Charter within the framework of Cabinet government.

39. Establish an International Development Advisory Council composed of individuals with experience and knowledge relevant to the effective pursuit of CIDA's humanitarian and development goals. The Council would assist the Government of Canada in formulating development policy; suggest ways of eliminating any discrepancies between commercial and international development policies; and submit an annual report to a parliamentary committee on CIDA's pursuit of its Charter objectives. The Council should also seek to relate humanitarian and development objectives to other aspects of post-conflict peace-building as elaborated in *An Agenda for Peace*.

The Need for Coordination

Turning from Canadian domestic policy, we soon find that coordination is the most difficult task faced by any UN reformer in the field of international development. On the surface, the problem seems

straightforward. The UN Charter locates responsibility for economic and social matters in ECOSOC which, as we have noted, is described in Chapter X of the Charter. That body, however, has never been as effective as either the General Assembly or the Security Council. While Article 63 gives ECOSOC the right to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies, it specifies that it must do so “through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.” In practice, the independence of the specialized agencies from both ECOSOC and the Secretary-General/Secretariat has been wide indeed. Moreover, any blunt attempt to bring them under a single, central control would undoubtedly fail, for some of the specialized agencies enjoy more support from UN member states than does the UN itself. On the other hand, leaving things as they are means perpetuating the disarray we have already described.

Finding a solution to problems of development is complicated by the fact that to speak of development in the 1990s is to speak of *sustainable* development. Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development and the Earth Summit that followed it, the tensions between environmental protection and resource conservation, on the one hand, and development imperatives, on the other, have become unmistakable. *Agenda 21*, the action plan that emerged from Rio, sets targets for sustainable development that we will ignore at a terrible price. Canada’s commitment to existing conventions on biodiversity and climate change, its obligation to press forward in negotiations towards a convention on desertification, and its attention to problems of overconsumption and waste are as vital to our common future as our commitment to closing the North/South gap. The coordination of the UN efforts on international development that we should work for must therefore take the insights of UNCED fully into account.

Choosing the Right Coordinating Body

Two kinds of response to the need for coordination have been advanced in recent discussions. The first places its faith in the Commission on Sustainable Development which has already been created to oversee the implementation of *Agenda 21*. This approach may have merit as an interim measure, but it is doubtful whether the

Commission can provide the high level directing force that is needed to persuade, cajole, seduce or force the conflicting fiefdoms of the international agencies to pursue equitable and sustainable development as their principal objective. Another stop-gap that can be used to cover the period during which we work for more thorough-going UN reform would be a 'Cancun-style' forum whereby any one of the major heads of government could host a representative summit of world leaders to tackle specific sustainable development issues, such as ensuring that the technologies the North transfers to the South are 'green' technologies and that resource development satisfies environmental protection criteria.

The second kind of response calls for *either* the reform of ECOSOC itself and an enlargement of its powers sufficient both to direct the policies of specialized agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the new World Trade Organization and to govern the two thirds of the UN's budget spent on development operations *or* the creation of a new high level body, often described as a Human Development Security Council or a Sustainable Development Security Council, to replace ECOSOC.

The details of the mandate and composition of a decision-making and coordinating body, whether it be ECOSOC reconstituted, or a new organization, must be the subject of wide-ranging, global debate, but the case for such a body seems irrefutable. The suggestions of the North-South Roundtable (created by the Society for International Development) for scope, composition and procedures are promising. The "Council" would deal with global poverty, unemployment, food security, ecological security, drug trafficking, migration, humanitarian assistance, and a new framework for sustainable human development. It would be made up of 11 permanent members from the main industrialized countries and larger developing economies and a rotating membership of 12 countries drawn from smaller countries in regional groupings. Its decisions would require an overall majority and a majority of both developed and developing groups.

The Canadian Government should therefore, in cooperation with like-minded governments:

40. Strongly urge the creation within the UN of a Sustainable Development Security Council, a high-level decision-making body with full coordination powers over specialized agencies. It should consult widely, especially with NGOs, on the details of the structure and mandate of such a body.

41. Present Canadian proposals on such a body to the World Social Summit as well as to the appropriate forums of the UN itself.

A revitalized UN programme of action for international sustainable development will benefit from a restatement of the UN's mission in this field. Such a World Development Charter would in part be a consolidation of development objectives scattered through numerous UN documents and in part a re-focusing of development based on the concepts of sustainable human development and human security. Canada should therefore:

42. Prepare a draft for a World Development Charter for the World Summit on Social Development that would serve as objectives for the UN's renewed development system.

43. Seek to ensure that national delegations heading to international meetings receive consistent instructions, not conflicting messages depending on what specialized agency or meeting is involved. An effort should also be made to coordinate these messages with like-minded countries, ideally so that a coalition of states might introduce exactly the same resolution in the governing bodies of a range of specialized agencies.

Support is gathering for a simple, but powerful, approach to development funding, the 20-20 formula. Under it, UN member states would agree that 20 per cent of all development assistance funding be devoted to basic needs like health and primary education and that

20 per cent of the budgets of recipient countries be earmarked for these purposes. Since Canada has already indicated that it will devote 25 per cent of ODA to social necessities, it is in an excellent position to promote this idea. It is therefore urged that Canada:

44. Endorse the 20-20 approach to development assistance funding and social expenditures.

The crucial role of women in development has finally won widespread recognition. Within the United Nations, UNIFEM, INSTRAW and several other smaller units have been created to enhance the work of women. There may be advantage, as the North-South Roundtable has proposed, in consolidating these elements in a much stronger UN Agency for the Advancement of Women. The precise form such a UN agency would take requires extensive consultation with women's groups. Canada should therefore:

45. Be prepared, after consultation with women's associations, to urge strongly the creation of an UN Agency for the Advancement of Women, incorporating UNIFEM and INSTRAW.

Funding for better coordinated and expanded UN operations in international development will in large part have to come from the assessments of member states. The idea of international taxation, however, must eventually be broached. Several proposals have been made, which are dealt with in the discussion of an Agenda for the Reform of the UN System, but the earmarking of certain international taxes for development uses merits close consideration.

An Agenda for Human Rights

There is increasing emphasis being placed on questions of human rights within significant parts of the international community. One reason for this phenomenon is that the systematic violation of rights has international repercussions. One, but by no means the only, example of this is the recent vast migrations of peoples, that in turn demand multilateral action in order to cope. Another reason is a growing perception that states, which systematically deny their own citizens basic freedoms of expression and creation may constitute threats to international peace and security, requiring an international response.

At the same time, there is considerable resistance, especially on the part of many Southern states, to international action on human rights. On the contrary, the growing self-confidence, particularly of Asian states, whose human rights record is open to severe criticism, has led to a strong rejection by them of Western-led efforts to influence their human rights policies.

The fact is that the United Nations was born with an internal contradiction that has never been resolved: its members are states, but its goals are human values. In the light of such divergent pressures, the accomplishments of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights are all the more impressive. The Vienna Declaration stands as a strong endorsement of the basic premises that have underpinned the UN's human rights activities since 1948: "the universal nature of [established international human rights principles] is beyond question"; "the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community"; and "it is the duty of States...to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms."

The Vienna Declaration was subsequently approved at the fall 1993 session of the UN General Assembly, which also adopted a Declaration on Violence Against Women and, most significantly, created the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The mandate of this Commissioner needs to be carefully scrutinized to

see how it unfolds because, although the office has considerable potential, the obstacles to its effectiveness are no less substantial.

One of the most contentious issues will be the ability of the High Commissioner to intervene effectively in alleged cases of gross and persistent violations of human rights within a state. In the past, when sovereign interests and human rights collided, states rarely lost. This principle appears to be eroding, if very slowly and incrementally. There is a decreasing level of tolerance for arguments which place concerns for national sovereignty above clear violations of human rights, whether on an individual or a community basis. Human rights are more and more perceived as interrelated and less and less considered a matter for each state to define and regulate on its own. It is encouraging, for example, to note that the High Commissioner has been exercising his authority to intervene with respect to the crisis in Rwanda and has been reporting his findings to the Secretary-General. This is a distinct improvement, although the disparity between limited achievements such as these and the palpable suffering of peoples the world over remains profound.

Another important challenge for the High Commissioner will be to encourage basic administrative coherence and efficiency. The UN human rights organs have evolved in *ad hoc*, spasmodic and politically pragmatic ways such that the High Commissioner has inherited what might be described as the antithesis of a system – one that is characterized by lack of coordination, of a rational division of labour, or of any clear institutional blueprint. The proliferation of human rights instruments and the dramatic increases in the number of states ratifying one or more of them has created a system that is not working well either for the treaty bodies or for the states that must report to them. At present, for example, there are seven treaty bodies having the responsibility of supervising respect for international standards. They are: the Human Rights Committee (relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (relating to the Covenant of the same name), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Group of Three on Apartheid, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee against Torture, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the latter bodies relating to similarly-named Conventions re-

spectively). There are a number of instances where certain rights are being considered under more than one of these bodies.

In an effort to streamline this system, several possibilities should be considered. For example, rather than requiring states to submit a country profile to each of the treaty bodies at the time of ratification or accession, a state might be required to prepare a comprehensive core document that each treaty body would use as the country profile. An effort should also be made to address the question of overlapping "jurisdictions". A coordinated system would allow for the state's report on a specific right, filed with a treaty body or with another relevant body such as the International Labour Organization, to be transferred to another treaty body at the time that right is under examination. Another possibility would be for treaty bodies to explore an informal division of primary competencies among them.

The above proposals are technical and administrative in nature and could be implemented fairly easily if consensus could be achieved. A more difficult task would be to undertake reform of the treaty bodies over the longer term. One possibility would be a limited consolidation of treaty bodies so that only two or three committees would be needed. Another would be to streamline the reporting obligations of states. This would entail a single comprehensive report by each member state, thus eliminating difficulties relating to overlapping mandates, ensuring the equality of rights, and reducing the demands on limited bureaucratic resources of many member states.

46. The Government of Canada should encourage ways and means of strengthening the work of the various international human rights treaty bodies and reducing duplication and overlapping responsibilities. Administrative reforms should emphasize coordination coupled with divisions of labour on the part of the treaty bodies.

47. Over the longer-term, the Government of Canada should press for a consolidation of treaty bodies and a streamlining of the reporting obligations of states.

48. Canada should urge the new UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to publish annually a comprehensive report on the state of human rights around the world. An alternative in the meantime would be for NGOs to prepare such a report based on UN documents, with the support of the UN High Commissioner. It is recommended that the Canadian government consider providing financial assistance to help launch such an exercise.

49. In developing proposals for an international early warning system for the United Nations, such as were mentioned in Recommendation #22 under Agenda for Peace, the Government should encourage efforts to coordinate with highly relevant UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees. At this point, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has no information system and needs one.

Canada should press for greater coordination between UN specialized agencies and Secretariat functions over human rights questions. It should urge that the Secretary-General create a high-level task force charged with recommending a series of steps that could be taken across the UN system, plus suggestions as to implementation. The High Commissioner for Human Rights should convene annually a meeting of representatives of all relevant UN specialized agencies to facilitate coordination and the exchange of information. The Government of Canada should press for the rapid implementation of a programme of action for the newly created High Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure an effective UN field presence when human rights are violated or are in jeopardy, including maximizing the use of existing field offices of such agencies as the UNDP and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

50. The Government of Canada should encourage the exploration of key questions such as precedents for international intervention in the internal affairs of states in response

to gross and persistent violations of human rights. Such a knowledge base could be shared informally with like-minded member states and with key officials of the United Nations in order to provide some standards by which to judge current problems.

51. The Government of Canada should encourage the United Nations to make greater use of the policy of using “*eminent persons*” who could, on their own responsibility but with at least the implicit support and the explicit resources of the UN, convene a series of informal meetings among rival factions in member states whose integrity is clearly endangered by ethnic or religious strife. These informal meetings would be intended as the first of a potential series of roundtables leading to the development of a new national “*modus vivendi*”.

52. The Government of Canada should propose guidelines for ensuring that the Bretton Woods financial institutions and the new World Trade Organization take into account the human rights (political, civil, social, economic and cultural) impact of their decisions.

The Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations

Patrons

The Governor General of Canada
The Prime Minister of Canada
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Lieutenant Governors of each province
The Commissioners of each Territory
The Premiers of each Province and Territory

Honourary Members

Rt. Hon. Edward Schreyer, former Governor General

Former Ambassadors to the United Nations

C.S.A. Ritchie	Yvon Beaulne
Saul Rae	William Barton
Michel Dupuy	G�rard Pelletier
Stephen Lewis	Yves Fortier

Recipients of the UNA-Canada Pearson Peace Medal

Georges-Henri Levesque	Lois Wilson
Meyer Brownstone	Nancy Meek Pocock
Edward Scott	Maurice Strong
Murray Thomson	Muriel Duckworth
Eric Hoskins	Escott Reid

Corporate Council

Allan R. Taylor, Co-Chair	Stanley Hartt
Jean-Claude Delorme, Co-Chair	Maurice Strong
William Blundell	William J. Toppeta
Richard Drouin	Reginald Weiser
J. Trevor Eyton	Lynton Ronald Wilson
Margot Franssen	Additional Members TBA
Hollis L. Harris	

Members of the Canadian Committee

Douglas Roche, O.C., Chairperson

Executive Group

Brian Anthony
Angus Archer
Thomas Axworthy
William Barton
Dean J. Browne
Sujit Chowdhury
Jocelyne Côté-O'Hara
Guy Coulombe
Susan Francis
Louise Fréchette
David Gélinas
Nancy Gordon
Geoffrey Grenville-Wood
John Harker
Chris Henderson

Veronica Lacey
Viviane F. Launay
Hon. Flora MacDonald
Louise Maffett
Michael Oliver
Hon. Gérard Pelletier
Geoffrey Pearson
Lewis Perinbam
Jennifer Allen Simons
Ken Sinclair
J. Fernand Tanguay
Manon Vennat
Norma Walmsley
Jodi White
Maxwell Yalden

Provincial and Territorial Government Representatives

Hon. Gretchen Brewin
Wayne Clifford
Michael Hayden
Hon. Duff Roblin
Hon. Stephen Lewis
Hon. Walter McLean
Jean René

Hon. Eric Allaby, MLA
Allan Bishop
Hon. Walter McEwen
William Wells
Kimberly Bain
Bernard Funston

Community Representatives

Hon. Raynell Andreychuk
Douglas Bassett
Keith Bezanson
Paul Beaulieu
Hon. Alan Blakeney
Herb Breau
Edward Broadbent
Colin P. Campbell
Maria Campbell
Margaret Catley-Carlson
Howard C. Clark
Adrienne Clarkson

Maxwell Cohen
Gisèle Côté-Harper
Thomas d'Aquino
Jean-Claude Delorme
Jules Deschênes
André Desmarais
Marion Dewar
Jacques Dupuis
Fredrik Eaton
J. Trevor Eyton
Christine A. Featherstone
Maureen Forrester

Arthur Gelber
Nicholas Goldschmidt
Stanley Hartt
Ivan Head
John Humphrey
Pierre-Marc Johnson
Donald Lander
Paul Lapierre
Hon. Charles Lapointe
Gilles Lefebvre
Albert Legault
Hon. Allan J. MacEachen
Elizabeth Mann-Borgese
Jack McCracken
Hon. Alexa McDonough
Peter Meincke
David Mirvish
Robert Moore
Darren Murray

Ian D. C. Newbould
Michel Philibert
Ceta Ramkhalawansingh
Escott Reid
Edward Rogers
Mairuth Sarsfield
Hon. Mitchell Sharp
Paul Shay
Mary Simon
Jim Sinclair
Muriel Smith
John Snow
Jean-Pierre Soublière
Susan Tanner
Allan Taylor
Shirley Thomson
Manon Vennat
Robert White
Sandra Wilson

Parliamentary Representatives

Chair, Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
Chair, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
Opposition Foreign Affairs Critics

***United Nations Association in Canada
Regional Representatives***

Satellite Committee Members

Mass Outreach/Communications

David Gélinas, Co-Chair
Susan Francis, Co-Chair
Angus Archer
Donna Balkan
Dan Blum
Ruth Foster
Toby Fyfe

Daniel Gagnier
Jean-Pierre Morin
Peter O'Malley
Norman Simon
Jim Thompson
Tim Woods

UN Reform

Michael Oliver, Chair
John M. Benesh
Gisèle Côté-Harper

Jules Dufour
Edward English
Nancy Gordon

Georges Hénault
Maureen O'Neil
Geoffrey Pearson
David Pollock
Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon
Louis Sabourin
Ronald St. John Macdonald

John Sigler
Christopher Spencer
Stanley Urman
Fergus Watt
Norma E. Walmsley
Gregory Wirick

Arts and Culture

Brian Anthony, Chair
Perry Anglin
Nini Baird
Marlene Chan
Michel Cheff
Michelle D'Auray

Colin Jackson
Keith Kelly
Angela Lee
Monique Mercure
Rocky Paul Wiseman

Youth

Sujit Chowdhury, Chair
Sabrina DiMarco
Nicholas Drouin
Lani Gozlan

Mario Lavoie
Duncan Moore
Sunil Sharma
Colleen Thouéz

Education and Public Awareness

Veronica Lacey, Chair
Michel Agnaieff
Tom Axworthy
Ruth Baumann
Robert E. Blair
Joan Broughton
Tim Grant
Jim Grieve

John Horton
Diane Laberge
Viviane F. Launay
Tom Lyons
Marie Pierce
Bob Pletsch
Dr. Roseann Runte
Mairuth Sarsfield

Strategic Planning and Finance

Christopher Henderson, Chair
Angus Archer
Jocelyne Côté-O'Hara
Dan Donovan
David Gélinas
Robert Gayner

Stanley Hartt
Hon. David McDonald
Louise Maffett
Al Nashir-Jamal
Diana Thébaud-Nicholson
David Sherwood

Community Participation

Lewis Perinbam, Co-Chair
Manon Vennat, Co-Chair
Alan Clarke

Diana Thébaud-Nicholson
Rose Potvin

Secretariat

Angus Archer
Matthieu Brennan
Dean Browne
Marlene Chan

Susan Francis
Gary Sealey
Gregory Wirick
Elizabeth Thompson

